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1. Introduction 
One of the most debated issues in public economics is whether capital income should 
be taxed or not. Although there seems to be broad consensus that taxing savings is 
presumably “a bad idea” (Atkeson et al., 1999), one has to admit that truly compelling 
arguments are lacking. While equity arguments are used both to attack and to justify 
the taxation of capital, efficiency arguments are at best inconclusive. They lend 
themselves to argument against the taxation of capital in a model of finite horizon only 
if particular preferences are assumed for which the empirical evidence is weak. If the 
choice of preferences is to play no critical role, one has to rely on Chamley (1986) and 
Judd (1985). Their result establishes that the optimal tax rate on capital income tends 
to zero in a model of infinite horizon. The problem with this result, however, is not 
only that it does not extend to a finite horizon. More critical is that it is biased in one 
important respect. It holds for a framework that models the accumulation of nonhuman 
capital but ignores the accumulation of human capital. If however the two courses of 
capital accumulation are modelled more symmetrically, the reason for discriminatory 
taxation disappears. More precisely, Chamley and Judd’s result on zero capital-income 
taxation in the limit is then seen to extend to labour taxes (Jones et al., 1997). This 
result is not convincing either, however. It relies on blurring differences between 
human and nonhuman capital, and it raises even more the question as to which 
ultimate economic feature makes the one differ from the other. 
In this paper, the difference between human and nonhuman capital is modelled as a 
short-run difference in returns. The returns to saving are assumed to be constant, while 
those of education are assumed to be decreasing. Decreasing returns give rise to pure 
profit. The profit of education is special for two reasons. First, the immediate outcome 
of education is ability only. Skills acquired by education do not pay off if not 
combined with additional own labour effort. It is in this sense that the profit of 
education is quasi-pure. Secondly, it is not clear what efficient taxation should do with 
the quasi-pure profit of education. Consumption and labour taxes cut off some profit; 
they do not however skim it off fully. In this paper it is shown that second-best policy 
abstains from distorting the decision to invest in one’s own human capital. To reach   3
this objective, the supply of labour and even the decision to save have to be distorted 
in general. Hence there is a strict order of policy priority. Efficient tax policy ranks 
investment in human capital higher than any other supply-and-demand decision of 
private households and thus also higher than the decision to invest in nonhuman 
capital.  This result is derived for the standard two-period life-cycle model with 
endogenous choices of labour, education, and saving. It assumes an isoelastic earnings 
function and holds else for arbitrary utility functions. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets up the model of a representative 
taxpayer. Section 3 introduces policy instruments and the planner’s objective function. 
In Section 4 it is shown to be efficient not to distort human-capital investment. The 
result generalizes one derived before by Richter (2007) in a less structured model. 
Section 5 explores the implication for the taxation of nonhuman capital. Section 6 
summarizes. Major proofs are relegated to a technical Appendix.  
 
 
2. A representative-household model 
Consider a representative household living for two periods. Lifetime utility is given by 
, where   is consumption and   is non-leisure time in period i=1,2. 
Non-leisure time   is identical with second-period labour supply. By contrast, only 
−E is time spent in the market; time E is spent on education. First-period labour 
supply earns a constant wage rate 
1212 (,,,) UCC LL
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2 L
1 ω ; the productivity of second-period labour 
depends on the amount of education. It is paid  2 () HE ω , where  2 ω  is constant while 
the earnings function H(E) displays positive but diminishing returns, H′>0>H′′. We 
will also refer to qualified labour in the case of   and of nonqualified labour in the 
case of  . Education has a cost in forgone earnings, which is captured by 
2 L
1 L 1 ω E. 
Monetary costs of education like college fees come on top of these and are modelled 
by  E ϕ . The share of first-period income that is neither spent on education nor on 
consumption is saved, 
  11 1 1 1 1 1 () () S L E E qC L E qC ω ϕω ω ϕ =− − − = − + − .    (1)   4
Second-period consumption is constrained by income earned, 
  22 () qC S H E L2 ρ ω =+   .        (2) 
Here q is the consumer price of consumption and ρ  is the gross rate of return to 
saving. All prices are after taxes and subsidies, and the question is which combination 
of taxes and subsidies is second-best efficient. The representative household is 
assumed to maximize utility in   subject to the lifetime budget constraint  1212 ,, ,, CCLLE
  12 1 1 2 2 () qC qC L H E L E ρ ρω ω π += + −       (3) 
stated in second-period units. Interpret  ) ( 1 ϕ ω ρ π + ≡  as the effective (unit) cost of 
education. 
The analysis relies on the dual approach to optimal taxation. This means that the focus 
is shifted from the household’s (indirect) utility function to its (net) expenditure 
function. The task of minimizing (net) expenditures subject to an exogenous utility 
constraint is best solved in a two-step approach. At the first step income derived from 
education is maximized while keeping the level of   fixed. Let this income be 
denoted by 
2 L
) , , ( 2 2 L Y π ω   ] ) ( [ max 2 2 E L E H
E π ω − ≡ , and the optimal amount of education 
by  ) , 2 L , ( 2 E π ω . The optimal amount is implicitly defined by the first-order condition, 
22 ' HL ω π
2 w
= . If the second-period labour supply   were exogenous, Y would stand 
for pure profit. However, the focus is here on an endogenous choice of  . Hence Y 
has to be interpreted as quasi-pure profit, the source of which is education and its 
diminishing return. Second-period labour supply increases Y only indirectly via 
increased incentives for education. Let the second-period wage rate before taxes be 
denoted by  , and the effective social cost of education (i.e., the effective cost before 
taxes and subsidies) by p. Education is efficient if the tax wedge between the marginal 
social return and the effective social cost, 
2 L
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vanishes. Obviously, the tax wedge vanishes if, and only if, the rates of return before 





=   .             ( 4 )  
The main result of this paper states that it is efficient (in the second-best sense) not to 
compromise on efficiency in education. Note that second-best efficiency refers to total 
analysis, while efficiency in education is a partial concept. 
The expenditure function is defined as 
  ≡ ) ; , , , , ( 2 1 u q e ϕ ρ ω ω    121 1 21 2 min[ ( , ( ), )] qC qC L Y L ρ ρω ω ρ ω ϕ + −− +  
in    such that  .  121 ,, , CCLL 2
2
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Hotelling’s lemma yields  1 q eC C ρ =+ , where  12 (, , , ,;) ii CC q u ω ωρ ϕ =  solves the 
optimization and where the subscript q denotes a partial derivative. By relying on a 
straightforward generalization of the textbook version of Hotelling’s lemma one 
likewise derives the identities  ) ( 1 E L −
1
e





,  eϕ  =  E ρ , and eρ  = 
11 1 1 () qC L E ω ωϕ −+ + =  . Just like  , the functions   and S are Hicksian ones 
and have to be evaluated at 
S − Ci i L
ϕ ρ ω ω , , , , 2 1 q
( , ( 1 2 E
, and u. As a result, the fully specified 
education function reads  )) ; , , , , 2 1 u q ( ), 2 L E ϕ ρ ω ω ϕ ω ρ ω + = . 
 
3. Policy instruments 
The analysis studies the efficient mix of four policy instruments, each of which is 
distorting. The first one is a tax  >0 on consumption. Treating consumption as a 
numéraire good with a producer price of one, this implies q=1+ . 
C t
C t
The second instrument is a tax   on the monetary social cost of education f, so that  E t
f tE) 1 ( + = ϕ  results. Negativity of   is not ruled out, so that subsidizing education is 
a feasible policy. 
E t
The third instrument is a tax τ  on capital income. Again negative values of τ  are not 
ruled out. As it turns out, it is convenient to define the capital tax in exclusive form. 
Denoting the gross social return to saving by r, exclusiveness means that τ  satisfies   6
the condition  ρ τ) 1 ( + = r . In other words, the base of the capital tax excludes the tax 
payment. 
The fourth policy instrument is a subsidy σ  to labour income earned in the first 
period. This requires  1 ) 1 ( w 1 ω σ = + , where   denotes the market wage rate. Second-
period labour income is assumed to remain untaxed: 
1 w
2 2 w = ω . Given that consumption 
is taxable, nothing is gained by introducing a tax on second-period labour. It would 
only provide a redundant instrument, which could be duplicated by an appropriate 
choice of the four other policy instruments. As first-period labour is nonqualified 
while second-period labour is qualified, a positive σ  can be interpreted as a policy 
regime in which labour income is taxed progressively with respect to qualification. All 
social costs,  ,  , r, and f, are treated as exogenous parameters of the planner’s 
optimization. This holds a fortiori for the effective social cost of education, 
. 
1 w 2 w
12 () CE tr C C
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There is a need to raise tax revenue in order to finance government expenditures. 
Government’s net tax revenue amounts to 
T ≡ 1 1 ( t r f E S r w L E ) τρσ +− −
( ) ( ) ( ) C rf E rS
++
12 1)( qr C
    
      =  11 1 ( )( ) r w L E ϕ ρω + −− −+ + − + − . 
By invoking Hotelling’s lemma this can be written as 
T =  11 1 1
11
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The social planner is assumed to maximize tax revenue T subject to the condition that 
private net expenditure remains constant at zero level, e=0. Let all the conditions of 
regularity hold that are needed to make the optimization a well-behaved problem. A 
set of instruments  >0,  ,  C t E t τ , and σ  is said to be second-best efficient if it solves the 
planner’s maximization problem. The assumption that   has to be positive rules out 
the trivial case that all tax rates are zero. The constellation with  >0= =
C t
C t E t τ =σ  is 
feasible. However, it distorts consumption and labour choices, and the key question is   7
whether it is more efficient to reduce   and to compensate the reduction by 




4. Efficient policy 
Maximizing government’s net revenue T in  ,  ,  C E t τ , and σ  subject to a balanced-
budget constraint on the taxpayer, e=0, yields a problem that can easily be solved by 
applying the standard Lagrange technique. Maximizing in  ,  ,  C t E t τ , and σ  is 
obviously equivalent to maximizing in  ρ ϕ, , q , and  1 ω . Taking partial derivatives with 
respect to the latter variables, invoking Hotelling’s lemma, and eliminating the 
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Δ where the differentiation operator   applies to arbitrary functions 
12 (, , , ,;) XX q u ω ωρ ϕ = . The operator is defined as follows: 
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For a proof of (6) see the Appendix. Reshuffling (6) gives us a system of equalities, 
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According to (6′), efficiency is achieved if prices are set such that the derivatives of E, 
, and   ( i=1,2) induce equiproportionate changes if taken in the direction of    1 L i C
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More loosely speaking, efficient policy induces equiproportionate reductions in 
education E, nonqualified labour  , and periodic consumption   (i=1,2) when all 
these behavioural functions are interpreted in the Hicksian sense. Note that qualified 
labour   is missing from this list. 
1 L i C
2 L
 
Proposition  1: Efficient policy requires equiproportionate reductions in education, 
nonqualified labour, and periodic consumption. 
 
Proposition 1 raises the question as to which constellations of  ρ ϕ, , q , and  1 ω  induce 
equiproportionate reductions. Clearly, one should not expect any interesting 
relationship to hold in full generality. Still, a remarkably strong result is obtained if the 
individual earnings function is assumed to be isoelastic in education,   with 
η E) ( hE = H
1 < η . 
 
Proposition 2: If the individual earnings function is isoelastic, it is efficient not to 
distort the choice of education. 
 
Given that  2 2 w = ω  has been assumed, not to distort education requires leaving the 
effective cost unchanged: 
1 () ρ ωϕ π +=     .        ( 4 ′)  = 1 ( pr w f =+ )
The proof is given in the Appendix. 
The generality of the proposition is striking. Beyond the standard regularity 
assumptions of household optimization, there are no additional ones needed to 
constrain the choice of utility functions. However, isoelasticity of the individual 
earnings function is indispensable. 
From a purely mathematical point of view isoelasticity may look very special. 
However, its assumption can well be defended by referring to the power law of   9
learning known from cognitive psychology. The content of the power law is the 
following. According to common experience, most tasks get faster with practice, and 
this holds across task size and task type. If the relationship between practice and the 
completion time of a task is plotted, a power law is generally seen to provide the best 
fit. Education is undoubtedly broader and more complex than the training for certain 
tasks. However, “the power law of practice is ubiquitous” (Ritter et al., 2001), and it 
would not be plausible to doubt its empirical relevance for the formation of abilities, 
which after all is the economically relevant essence of education. 
Combining Propositions 1 and 2 implies that efficient policy well tolerates a reduction 
in educational effort. This reduction cannot be interpreted, however, as a distortion of 
education, but only as a distortion in the supply of qualified labour. The intuition 
underlying Proposition 2 is the following. In deciding on education and labour supply 
the private household trades off costs against benefits. The benefits are given by labour 
income and by the private profit from education, which in real terms amounts to Y/q. 
In the general case of  2 w2 ω ≠ , the social profit is 

















which equals  2 / wY 2 ω  whenever (4) holds. The significance of efficiency in education 
is hence seen to be in the alignment of private and social objectives. By maximizing 
the private profit from education, Y/q, the social profit,  2 / wY 2 ω , is maximized as well. 
Isoelasticity of H serves to ensure that this perfect alignment of private and social 
objectives need not be compromised. If the earnings function fails to be isoelastic, it 
may well be optimal to exploit variations in the elasticity of the earnings function and 
to trade off resulting efficiency gains against distortions in the choice of education.  
Proposition 2 has to be contrasted with a result by Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005). 
These authors likewise identify circumstances under which human-capital investment 
should remain undistorted. See also Jacobs and Bovenberg (2006). There are notable 
differences, however. Bovenberg and Jacobs focus on the optimal trade-off between 
equity and efficiency when skill formation is endogenous, and they enlarge the set of 
policy instruments by assuming that a poll tax is available. In substituting the equity   10
objective for the objective of generating tax revenue, their analysis goes beyond the 
present one. On the other hand, these authors are only able to derive efficiency of 
education for a scenario in which the cost of education is purely monetary. Costs of 
forgone earnings are ruled out. It is as if nonqualified labour   were exogenously 
fixed. As a result, education E degenerates to an intermediate good and – in contrast to 
the authors’ own suggestions in Jacobs et al. (2006) – the production efficiency 
theorem of Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) applies. By contrast, Proposition 2 is 
unrelated to the production efficiency theorem. It does not assume the availability of a 
poll tax, and it holds even though education provides disutility and fails to be an 
intermediate good. Above all, the Diamond–Mirrlees theorem has to assume that no 
pure profit accrues to the private sector, while Proposition 2 concerns quasi-pure 
profit, a share of which accrues privately. The suggested policy implications are very 
different, as will become better noticeable when discussing the efficient taxation of 
entrepreneurial profits. If the source of such profits is a fixed factor, then Diamond and 
Mirrlees suggest taxing such profits at one hundred percent. If however profits result 
from decreasing returns to learning and require personal labour effort, then Proposition 




5. Implications for taxing nonhuman capital 










.          ( 8 )  
This means that in the second-best optimum the tax on capital income, τ , has to equal 
the weighted sum of the subsidy to nonqualified labour, σ , and the tax on the 
monetary cost of education,  , with the weights given by the social costs   and f. 
This tight relationship indicates that one should not expect 
E t 1 w
τ  to equal zero except for 
very special cases. Remember that any efficient set of policy instruments has to solve 
both (6) and (4′). As a consequence, a pure consumption-tax regime, t >0= = C E t τ =σ ,   11
is well feasible and even partially efficient in the sense of not distorting education. As 
the regime implies  (1 ) q X qX Δ =−
1 , L
, it is totally efficient, however, only if the 
elasticities of CC , and E with respect to q happen to be equal at these particular 
parameter values. In other words, total efficiency requires a well-balanced use of 
policy instruments, and the efficient 
12 ,
τ  will only be zero in non-generic cases to be 
discussed below.  
 
Corollary: It is generically efficient to distort saving.  
 
From combining Proposition 2 and the Corollary an order of policy priority is derived. 
According to this policy order the decision to invest in human capital ranks higher than 
the decision to invest in nonhuman capital. The reason is that the former generates 
quasi-pure profit and the latter does not. Efficiency requires not impairing the 
incentives to earn ability profit beyond what appears to be unavoidable. Unavoidable 
are the negative incentives that consumption or wage taxes exert on the supply of 
qualified labour. By contrast, education should remain undistorted. In general this 
objective requires distorting the savings decision. 
The indicated policy priority is in line with a result of Jacobs and Bovenberg (2005). 
These authors demonstrate that there are constellations where a positive tax on 
nonhuman capital serves to alleviate tax distortions in human-capital investment. That 
result however reverses the intuition conveyed by Nielsen and Sörensen (1997). These 
authors take the capital income tax as given, and they study its implication for efficient 
taxation of human-capital investment. Hence they implicitly reverse the suggested 
policy order. Human-capital policy is used to accommodate distortions in nonhuman-
capital policy. More precisely, Nielsen and Sörensen show that a progressive income 
tax is needed to offset the tendency of a proportional comprehensive income tax to 
discriminate in favour of human-capital investment. In view of Proposition 2, their 
result is at best one characterizing third-best policy. 
One should mention that Nielsen and Sörensen (1997) ignore monetary costs of 
education when modelling endogenous labour supply, while Jacobs and Bovenberg   12
(2005) ignore forgone earnings. Proposition 2 cannot, however, be expected to hold in 
full generality if just one of these two kinds of education costs is modelled. The set of 
prices and policy instruments must be sufficiently rich to neutralize the effect that 
taxation has on human-capital investment. More precisely, it must be possible to tax or 
to subsidize the monetary cost of education, and it must also be possible to tax or to 
subsidize nonqualified labour at a rate that may deviate from both the former and the 
tax applied to qualified labour. 
The Corollary does not rule out the possibility that it is efficient to set τ =0 for special 
utility functions. As a matter of fact, efficiency of τ =0 holds if the utility function 
takes the form  =UF  with some homothetic function 
F. The argument is as follows. If F is homothetic, the optimizing individual allocates 
lifetime consumption in such a way that the ratio   only depends on the rate of 
interest. Hence 
1212 (,,,) UCC LL
12() CC c
12 1 ((, ) ,, CC LL
2 C
2 )
1 / C 2 C
ρ ρ + =  holds with some appropriately specified function 
() c ρ . On normalizing money units (r=1) and setting  r ρ ≡ ,  2 cCC () ρ ≡ , the 
taxpayer’s problem reads 
max        in  ,E   12 (, , ) UCLL 
12 ,, CLL
  subject to     11 2 2 1 () ( ) qC L H E L E ω ωω =+ − + ϕ .     ( 3 ′) 
Just as before, the social planner maximizes tax revenue. The only change is that the 
capital tax is no feasible policy instrument. When maximizing revenue with respect to 
>0,  ,  C t E t σ , and  2 2 w = ω , it likewise turns out to be efficient not to distort education, 
For the details see Richter (2007). In other words, Proposition 2 continues to hold. The 
intuition is that the policy instrument τ  is redundant when the subutility of 
consumption,  12 (, ) F CC , is homothetic. The tax on capital can be set equal to zero 
without jeopardizing efficiency. In this particular case it is even possible to sign   
and 
E t
σ . More precisely, as shown by Richter (2007), it is efficient to levy a positive tax 
on the monetary cost of education and to tax labour regressively with respect to 
qualification. That is, efficiency requires  >0= E t τ >σ  when  >0,  C t 2 2 w = ω . The only 
additional assumption needed is that the elasticity of consumption exceeds the 
elasticity of nonqualified labour when q is varied. In other words, the direct effect that   13
a change in q has on consumption needs to be stronger than the indirect effect that 
such a change has on the supply of nonqualified labour. The intuition for  >0> E t σ  is 
that it is efficient to set incentives so that qualified labour is substituted for 
nonqualified labour. Given that  2 2 w = ω  is assumed to hold, this objective is reached 
by setting  1 ω < 1 w σ ⇔ <0. Taxing nonqualified labour, however, means reducing the 
cost of forgone earnings, the partial effect of which is to encourage human-capital 
investment. The efficiency condition  1 ω ϕ + 1 wf = +  can then be restored only if the 
monetary cost of education is positively taxed: ϕ >f E t ⇔ >0. 
It is an interesting, though still open, question to what extent  >0> E t σ  continues to 
hold in the non-homothetic case of UC . Equally, it is not clear under 
which fully general conditions a subsidy to capital, 
1212 ,, C LL (, )





One of the most debated issues in public economics is whether capital income should 
be taxed or not. This paper suggests that proposed answers may well be useless if 
human capital, its formation, and its taxation are not appropriately taken into account. 
If this is done, a strict order of policy priority can be derived. According to this order, 
human-capital investment ranks higher than nonhuman-capital investment. The former 
should not be distorted, which in general requires that the latter will be distorted. The 
reason for this asymmetric treatment is that education – other than saving – generates 
quasi-pure profit, and taxation should not impair the efficient generation. This result is 
remarkably robust. In this paper it has been proved for the standard two-period life-
cycle model of a representative household with endogenous consumption, labour, and 
education. The result does not assume particularly selected utility functions, but only 
an isoelastic earnings function and a sufficiently rich set of policy instruments. 
Isoelasticity of earnings is justified with reference to the empirically well-founded 
power law of learning.   14
The present paper is not the first attempt to study economic implications of decreasing 
returns to learning. Well known is Arrow’s (1962) attempt to develop a theory of 
technical change and growth by drawing on the learning curve. In his model, however, 
the learning curve takes the role of a labour demand curve. Knowledge is completely 
embodied in capital, and at each moment of time capital goods of different vintages 
are in use. As Arrow stresses himself in his closing comments, the implicit assumption 
is that learning takes place only as a by-product of ordinary production. By way of 
contrast, learning is central in the present model. It is an individual investment in one’s 
own productivity and the result of endogenous choice. 
One cannot summarize without qualifying the obtained results. There are two points of 
weakness that need to be addressed more than others. One obvious shortcoming of the 
present analysis is certainly its pure focus on efficiency. Equity considerations have 
been entirely ignored. This is different from much of the cited literature and from the 
work of Bovenberg and Jacobs in particular. The conflict between equity and 
efficiency in human-capital policy is however not a simple one. In any case, it cannot 
be discussed satisfactorily just in passing. The interested reader is asked instead to 
refer to the literature as surveyed, e.g., by Carneiro and Heckman (2003). 
The other shortcoming can be seen in the lack of balance in the derived efficiency 
result. The clear policy prescription not to distort the educational choice contrasts with 
the inability to derive definite policy prescriptions for other areas of taxpayers’ choice. 
Only if the utility of consumption is assumed to be homothetic and separable from 
leisure can more be said. In this case, efficiency is enhanced by giving incentives to 
substitute qualified labour for nonqualified labour while respecting efficiency in 
education as a constraint. Furthermore, the efficient way of inducing substitution relies 
on taxing nonqualified labour more heavily than qualified labour and on restoring 
efficiency in education by taxing its monetary cost. See Richter (2007), where the 
result is interpreted by referring to the (weak) double-dividend hypothesis known from 
environmental economics. No doubt, popular conceptions of good education policy 
look different (Trostel, 2002). The contrast is however nothing but another indication 
for the need to enrich the present analysis by equity considerations in future research. 
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7. Appendix 
The proof of (6) relies on taking partial derivatives of the Lagrange function Te λ −  
with respect to  ρ ϕ, , q , and  1 ω : 














−+ =  .    (9) 
By Hotelling’s lemma and by the definition of the Δ-operator, one obtains 
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Plugging (10) into (9) yields  1/ EE λ Δ −= . Similarly one derives  



























The proof of Proposition 2 requires some preparatory considerations. Let 








denote the elasticity of X with respect to x. 
 
Remark 1:   Assuming  , 
η hE E H = ) ( 1 < η , and  ) ( 1 ϕ ω ρ π + ≡ , one obtains    
/ Yx ε  =  / Ex ε  +  /x π ε       for  1, ,, xq ρ ωϕ = .       ( 1 1 )  
 
Proof: Relying on the first-order condition  π ω = 2 2 'L H  allows one to express the 
ability rent Y as a strictly proportional function of E:  





π −  = 
1
(1 ) E π
η
− . 
(11) is an obvious implication. □ 
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Remark 2: Assuming  , 
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By relying on the definition of the expenditure function and by invoking Hotelling’s 
lemma one obtains 
  12 [] x x qC C ρ +     =
2 11 2 x L LY L x ρω +⋅     for   ϕ ρ ω , , , 1 q x = .   (12) 
The relationship (12) extends to the Δ-notation:   17
  12 [] qC C ρΔΔ +     =
2 11 L LY L 2 ρωΔ Δ + ⋅   .       ( 1 3 )  
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